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THE HUNTERS AND THE HUNTED: RIGHTS
AND LIABILITIES OF BAILBONDSMEN
I. Introduction
For over 150 years bailbondsmen have had the right to arrest their
principals' whenever and wherever they chose, and to recommit
them to government custody in order to avoid forfeiture of their
bond.2 This right was upheld when a bailbondsman forcibly entered
his principal's home in the middle of the night,3 when the bondsman
pursued his principal beyond state lines4 and even when the bonds-
man used physical force in the act of apprehension.5
This Note will examine the development of this extrajudicial
power to make arrests, the manner in which it is handled in the
1. Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166 (1822); Nicolls v. Ingersoll, 7 Johns. (N.Y.) 145 (1810).
2. In this area of the law, the principal is the party who has been arrested and is seeking
release from prison pending his scheduled court appearance. The party that posts the re-
quired amount of bail is commonly called the bailbondsman and in older cases is often
referred to simply as the bail or the surety.
When an arrest is made on the basis of a warrant, the amount of bail usually is set by the
judge authorizing the warrant and is noted on the warrant. By posting the amount of the bond
with the police officer in charge of the stationhouse, it is possible for the accused to obtain
pre-trial release. P. WicE, FREEDOM FoR SALE 21 (1974) (hereinafter WicE).
When an arrest is made without a warrant, as most arrests are, the accused must wait to
be arraigned, at which time the arraignment judge will set the amount of bail. A judicially
fixed bail schedule, based on the offense for which the arrest was made, is often used to set
the amount. WICE 22-23.
Usually a relative or friend contacts a bailbondsman who decides on the basis of the
accused's background, criminal record, community ties and the seriousness of the offense
whether the accused is a good risk. If he decides to write the bond he charges a fee based on
a percentage of the bond, normally between 10 and 12 percent, varying from state to state.
WICE 55-56.
If the person appears as scheduled in court, the bailbondsman is discharged from his
liability. When the accused does not appear, the amount of the bond may be forfeited to the
government, At this point the bondsman is in danger of losing his investment and will do all
he can to rearrest the "bailjumper" and avoid the forfeiture of the bond.
The bondsman may also choose to rearrest his principal before the scheduled court appear-
ance if he feels the person is about to abscond. The abuses have most often occurred when
bondsmen have attempted to rearrest their principals. WICE 21, 23, 55.
3. Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166 (1822); Nicolls v. Ingersoll, 7 Johns. (N.Y.) 145 (1810).
4. Fitzpatrick v. Williams, 46 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1931); Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166 (1822);
Nicolls v. Ingersoll, 7 Johns. (N.Y.) 145 (1810).
5. State v. Lingerfelt, 109 N.C. 755, 14 S.E. 75 (1891) (principal shot by bondsman's
agent); Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166 (1822) (principal struck during arrest); Nicolls v. Ingersoll,
7 Johns. (N.Y.) 145 (1810) (principal treated with "great roughness" by bondsman's agents).
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context of tort law, and the impact of civil rights legislation on the
rights of bailbondsmen.
II. Bailbondsmen In The Nineteenth Century
As early as 1810 Nicolls v. Ingersoll' established the bailbonds-
man's right, independent of government authority, to arrest his
principal at any time before or after a scheduled court appearance.
The New York court describing this power stated:
The power of taking and surrendering is not exercised under any judicial
process, but results from the nature of the undertaking by the bail. The
bailpiece is not process, nor anything in the nature of it, but is merely a
record or memorial of the delivery of the principal to his bail, on security
given. .... [T]his shows that the jurisdiction of the court in no way controls
the authority of the bail; and as little can the jurisdiction of the State affect
this right, as between the bail and his principal.'
Besides establishing that bailbondsmen derive their power of ar-
rest not from the State, but from the private contractual relation-
ship between bondsman and principal, Nicolls v. Ingersoll also es-
tablished the right of bondsmen to appoint agents to make such
arrests. The Nicolls court stated that it saw "nothing on general
principles, against allowing this power to be exercised by an agent
or deputy, and no case is to be found where the right has been
denied."9 In addition the court in Nicolls propounded the doctrine
that bondsmen could pursue and arrest a fugitive principal any-
where within the state or nation."0 It likewise refused to disturb the
jury's finding that the apprehension was not accomplished by
means of unreasonable force.
Plaintiff Nicolls had been released on a $500 bond in Connecti-
cut." Before Nicolls' scheduled appearance the bondsman author-
ized his agent the defendant, to cross into New York and arrest
Nicolls.12 After being denied entry into plaintiff Nicolls' house, the
6. 7 Johns. (N.Y.) 145 (1810).
7. Id. at 154.
8. Id.
9. Id. This principle of law has allowed bailbondsmen to employ what are, in effect,
bounty hunters. See Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366, 371-72 (1873); Reese v. United
States, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 13, 21-22 (1869); In re Von Der Ahe, 85 F. 959 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1898);
State v. Lingerfelt, 109 N.C. 775, 14 S.E. 75 (1891).
10. Nicolls v. Ingersoll, 7 Johns. (N.Y.) 145, 154 (1810).
11. Id. at 146.
12. Id.
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defendant broke into the house about midnight. 3 With the aid of
two companions the defendant roused Nicolls from his bed, took
him "with great roughness" without his coat, and transported him
to Connecticut. 4
Nicolls sued the bondsman's agent in tort for trespass, false im-
prisonment, and assault and battery."5 The jury found for the defen-
dant and the New York court accepted without question the jury's
finding of fact that the defendant did not use unreasonable force in
arresting Nicolls.15 Nicolls thus gave bondsmen wide latitude in
choosing when, where, and how to apprehend their principals. The
Nicolls court termed these rights "indispensable for the safety and
security of bail."' 7
Twelve years after Nicolls, a similar situation arose in Read v.
Case. As in Nicolls the bondsman employed an agent to make the
arrest.'" The agent broke into the plaintiff's home, struck him and
imprisoned him. 0
The Read court, while finding for the defendant bondsman, was
more explicit than NicolIs in stating what a bailbondsman could
and could not do in arresting his principal. The court stated that
before a bondsman or his agent could break into a principal's house
to make an arrest the bondsman or agent must announce his ident-
ity and intention.2 If peaceful entry is denied it would then be
lawful to break in and make the arrest.2 Although the bondsman's
agent made no such announcement before breaking into the plain-
tiff's house, the Read court excused this omission because the plain-
tiff had declared publicly that he would meet with force any such
13. Id. at 147.
14. Id. at 148.
15. Id. at 145.
16. Id. at 157. The court stated:
Whether the authority to arrest was not abused by the exertion of undue force, or
unnecessary severity, has been decided by the jury in favor of the defendant. This was
a matter of fact, proper to their determination, and was fairly submitted to them. The
verdict, therefore, on this point, ought not to be disturbed.
Id.
17. Id. at 156.
18. 4 Conn. 166 (1822).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 170.
22. Id.
1978]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
attempt to take him.3 The court decided that "[lilt would be a
palpable perversion of a sound rule to extend the benefit of it to a
man, who had full knowledge of the information he insists should
have been communicated; and who waited only for a demand, to
wreak on his bail the most brutal and unhallowed vengeance.''24
Thus the court in Read essentially agreed with the Nicolls holding
but articulated in greater detail and with greater emphasis the re-
striction on bailbondsmen that the Nicolls court briefly noted."
That common law requirement emerged early as one small check on
the broad powers of bailbondsmen.
It was not until 1869 that the United States Supreme Court dealt
with the rights of bailbondsmen. In Reese .v. United States"6 the
Court stated that a bondsman may arrest his principal anywhere in
the country and may do whatever is necessary to capture and return
him to custody." The Reese Court also referred to the private con-
tractual nature of the bail-principal relationship in stating that the
government impliedly convenanted not to interfere in any way with
this right of the bondsman. 8 Such language from the highest court
in the land amounted to nothing less than a carte blanche to bail-
bondsmen to take whatever liberties they felt were necessary in
arresting their principals.
The Supreme Court decision in Taylor v. Taintor29 soon gave
further encouragement to bailbondsmen. Unlike Nicolls and Read,
Taylor was not a tort action brought by a principal against his
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See Nicolls v. Ingersoll, 7 Johns. (N.Y.) at 156, where the court presumed that proper
demand for entry was made before the defendant broke in. Given the fact of the plaintiffs
threat, the court in Read made the correct decision. Even in the absence of a threat there
will always be cases where the fugitive is truly a dangerous person warranting dispensing with
the rule. However, bondsmen have shown no inclination to differentiate between traffic
violators and armed felons when making arrests.
26. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 13 (1869). This was an action by the United States against a surety
for forfeiture of a bond on an individual accused of land fraud. The accused was allowed to
return to Mexico by the United States Attorney pending resolution of two civil cases involving
the same facts. The accused's bondsman was not notified of this agreement. When the civil
cases were decided against the accused and the criminal charges were brought against him,
he failed to return from Mexico. The Supreme Court decided in favor of the bondsman, the
government having interfered with the bondsman's right to protect his security.
27. Id. at 21.
28. Id. at 22.
29. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366 (1873).
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bondsman.' However the Court did expound on the nature of the
bondsman-principal relationship and the rights of the parties. The
Court aptly described the power of the bondsman over his principal:
"'The bail have their principal on a string, and may pull the string
whenever they please, and render him in their discharge.' "I' The
Court further asserted that no right of the state was involved" nor
was any judicial process necessary for the bail to assert his
"dominion" over the principal.3
The Taylor Court also affirmed the right of a bondsman to author-
ize agents to arrest his principal for him34 and most significantly the
Court reiterated the Nicolls and Read doctrine that a bondsman
may, if necessary, break and enter his principal's home to arrest
him. 5
Twenty years later in United States v. Keiver,36 the United States
Circuit Court for the Western District of Wisconsin similarly held
that a bondsman could seize his principal at any time and any
place, including his home, which in the Anglo-American legal tradi-
tion, was a man's castle.37
The outer limits of the bondsman's rights were reached in State
v. Lingerfelt,3" decided in the late nineteenth century. A bonds-
man's agent shot and killed the bondsman's principal when the man
resisted arrest with a farm implement. 9 The agent was convicted of
murder.0 On appeal the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed
the conviction and granted a new trial.41 The court decided that the
30. Id. at 367-69. Taylor involved an action by a bondsman to recover the amount of his
bond from his principal who had been arrested for grand larceny in Connecticut. The plaintiff
had posted an $8,000 bond for the principal, whereupon the latter travelled to New York. In
New York he was arrested by the local police at the request of the governor of Maine, in whose
state he was wanted for burglary. He was tried, convicted and imprisoned in Maine causing
the plaintiff to forfeit his bond in Connecticut. Id.
31. Id. at 371-72.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 371.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 56 F. 422 (C.C.W.D. 1893) (action by the federal government to obtain forfeiture of a
bond).
37. Id. at 426. Accord, State v. Dwyer, 70 Vt. 96, 39 A. 629 (1897).
38. 109 N.C. 775, 14 S.E. 75 (1891).
39. Id. at 775, 14 S.E. at 76.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 776, 14 S.E. at 77. The trial court charged the jury that as a matter of law there
19781
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trial court had construed the rights of a bondsman in rearresting his
principal too restrictively. Citing Taylor and Nicolls as the correct
rule of law,42 the court indicated that under the broad powers
granted to bailbondsmen the defendant Lingerfelt may have been
within his rights in using whatever force he felt was necessary to
arrest the principal. 3
The courts in the nineteenth century thus put few limits on the
methods bailbondsmen could use in arresting their principals. The
essential reason for judicial reluctance to interfere in this area was
the private contractual nature of the bondsman-principal relation-
ship from which the bondsman derived his sweeping power of ar-
rest.4 The essence of the contractual agreement was that the bonds-
man agreed to post bail for the principal in order that he (the princi-
pal) be freed temporarily from prison, pending resolution of the
charges against him. In return the principal agreed that the bonds-
man could rearrest him whenever he chose, either before the princi-
pal was to appear in court or after he failed to do so. And as the
Supreme Court stated in Reese, the government impliedly agreed
not to interfere with the bondsman's right to safeguard his bond.4
Nor was process considered necessary for a bondsman to rearrest
his principal. Since no power of the state or federal governments
was involved, there was no need to comply with constitutional re-
quirements of due process or equal protection of the laws.47 The
courts in the early cases did not apply these constitutional princi-
ples. In In re Von DerAhe wherein plaintiff argued that his constitu-
tional rights were violated,48 the court rejected his claim of depriva-
tion of liberty without due process of law, again holding that the
private contract between bail and principal was beyond the bounda-
was no evidence that the defendant had any lawful authority to arrest the victim. Id., 14 S.E.
at 76.
42. Id. at 777-78, 14 S.E. at 76-77.
43. Id. at 779, 14 S.E. at 77.
44. See note 9 supra.
45. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) at 22.
46. Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366, 371-72 (1873); In re Von Der Ahe, 85 F. 959,
960-63 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1898); Nicolls v. Ingersoll, 7 Johns. (N.Y.) 145, 154 (1810); State v.
Lingerfelt, 109 N.C. 775, 777-78, 14 S.E. 75, 76 (1891).
47. U.S. CONST. amends. V and XIV.
48. In re Von Der Abe, 85 F. 959 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1898) (plaintiff claimed he was deprived
of his liberty without due process of law).
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ries of constitutional requirements."
Aggrieved principals seeking redress against overzealous bonds-
men and their agents have relied almost exclusively on the ordinary
common law tort remedies for false imprisonment, assault and bat-
tery. As the cases reveal, the courts construe the bail contract to
allow bondsmen wide discretion in how they conduct their busi-
ness. 0 Thus, the tort approach has had little success.
III. The Development of Limits on the Rights of Bailbondsman
since 1900
A. Adherence To the Nineteenth Century Doctrines
The decisions rendered during the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury adhered closely to the holdings of the nineteenth century
cases.
5
'
One of the earlier cases in this century, Fitzpatrick v. Williams,52
reaffirmed all the earlier common law principles which were so fa-
vorable to the bailbondsman. In restating the private contractual
basis of the bail-principal relationship" the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that bailbondsmen had the right
to arrest their principals without a warrant,54 pursue them across
state lines, return them to the home state without extradition pro-
ceedings,55 authorize agents to make such arrests for them," and
essentially use any means necessary to effect such an arrest. These
basic tenets of the bail-principal relationship have been upheld in
numerous cases.
5 8
49. Id. at 962-63.
50. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
51. See text accompanying notes 6-50 supra.
52. 46 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1931). The plaintiff was arrested in New Orleans on charges of
being a fugitive from justice in the state of Washington. Although these charges were dropped
by the local authorities, a Washington bail company intervened. and requested that the
plaintiff be placed in its custody, presumably to obtain a discharge of the bond it had written
for him. Plaintiff appealed the court's order that the sheriff accede to that request.
53. Id. at 40.
54. Id. at 41.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Smith v. Rosenbaum, 333 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. -1971), aff'd, 460 F.2d 1019
(3d Cir. 1972); Curtis v. Peerless Ins. Co., 299 F. Supp. 429 (D. Minn. 1969); Thomas v.
Miller, 282 F. Supp. 571 (E.D. Tenn. 1968); McCaleb v. Peerless Ins. Co., 250 F. Supp. 512
(D. Neb. 1965).
19781
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By the middle of the twentieth-century there were few judicial
restraints upon the activities of bailbondsmen. For example, in
State v. Liakas'5 the Supreme Court of Nebraska stated in dictum
that the bailbondsman may "forcibly arrest" his principal and de-
liver him to the authorities in order to obtain exoneration from his
bond."' And in Golla v. State"' the Supreme Court of Delaware up-
held the right of a bondsman to pursue his principal anywhere in
the United States and return him from an asylum state without
extradition proceedings.
B. Development of Limits Through the Tort Approach
Despite a general lack of success in the mid-nineteenth and early
twentieth century attempts to obtain relief against bailbondsmen
through tort remedies,6" such attempts have continued. The results
have varied, and the implications for the future are still unclear.
A possible trend toward stricter controls is detectable in Mc Caleb
v. Peerless Ins. Co., a decision of the United States District Court
for the District of Nebraska.13 Plaintiff McCaleb sued his bond com-
pany in tort for false imprisonment, illegal detention and violation
of his constitutional liberties."' McCaleb was arrested for traffic
violations in Nebraska. 5 He obtained a $200 bond from the defen-
To some extent these common law principles have been codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (1970),
which provides that to discharge his obligation, a bailbondsman may arrest his principal at
any time and deliver him to a federal marshal.
A number of states have enacted similar provisions. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 15-13-62
(1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.63 (West 1947); N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 530.80 (McKinney
1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 53 (1964 Purdon) (suspended by PA. R. CiuM. P. § 4018); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 40-1227 (1975); TEX. CODE CIM. PROC. Art. 17.16 (Vernon 1977); UTAH CODE
ANN. tit. 77-43-22 (1953). At least two states have modified the common law. See TEX. CODE
CiuM. PRoc. Art. 17.19 (Vernon 1977) (which requiresan arrest warrant) and CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 847.5 (1970 West) (which requires extradition procedures in order to transport a fugitive
principal back to the jurisdiction from which he escaped). See section 11(D) infra.
59. 165 Neb. 503, 86 N.W.2d 373 (1957) (proceeding on an application of a bail bondsman
for discharge and exoneration of his bail bond where the state moved for forfeiture of the
bond).
60. Id. at 507, 86 N.W.2d at 377.
61. 50 Del. 497, 501, 135 A.2d 137, 139 (1957) (writ of habeas corpus by a prisoner contend-
ing that he was improperly arrested by his bailbondsman in Pennsylvania and returned to
Delaware without extradition proceedings).
62. See section II supra.
63. 250 F. Supp. 512 (D. Neb. 1965).
64. Id. at 513.
65. Id. at 513-14.
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dant bond company and thereupon fled to California."6 The defen-
dant's agent followed him to Caifornia, arrested him with the aid
of a local bailbondsman, and then drove him handcuffed around the
state for eighty hours. 7 When the defendant's agent finally returned
McCaleb to Nebraska he took title to McCaleb's car, apparently to
reimburse the defendant bond company for its forfeited bond.68 In-
stead of then turning the plaintiff over to the authorities, as was his
duty under the bond, the agent ordered him to leave Nebraska
immediately. 9
Chief Judge Richard E. Robinson found the defendant liable in
tort for false imprisonment and illegal detention.70 He likewise
found the arrest illegal and severely chastized the defendant for
acting solely to protect itself financially and in circumvention of its
legal duties.7 In conclusion he stated: "This type of action will not
be tolerated by this Court, and had this occurred with respect to a
bond given before this Court, the defendant would be forever barred
66. Id.
67. Id. This arrest was made in violation of CAL. PENAL CODE § 847.5 (West 1970). Appar-
ently the defendant's agent was not arrested for violation of the statute and Judge Robinson
made no mention of this violation. See note 58 supra and text accompanying notes 150-55
infra.
68. Id. at 514-15.
69. Id. at 515.
70. Id.
71. Id. Judge Robinson summarized the entire problem well, stating:
One purpose of allowing a person his liberty by use of a bond is to prevent such
person from being imprisoned for an unnecessary length of time without the [clourt
losing the assurance that such person will appear in court at the appointed time. The
bondsman has a duty signified by his written contract to present his principal before
the court. This is the basic reason for the rule which gives the bondsman the right to
pursue and arrest his principal. Fundamental interests of justice and society require
that a surety in a criminal case be given greater authority than the other types of
surities and bondsmen. But this authority is conditioned on the recognition of his duty
to the court to present the principal before the court. If this fundamental condition is
not obeyed, the entire purpose for which bonds are given and, collaterally, the rule
vesting broad authority in the bondsman will be effectively thwarted. It is the finding
of this [clourt that whenever a bondsman takes undue advantage of his justly granted
and needed authority in violation of his duty to the granting court and such undue
advantage results in injury or damage to his principal or another party, that bondsman
should and will be rendered liable for any damage caused as a result of an act or acts
which would render liable any other person who was not vested with such authority.
Id. (emphasis added).
Interestingly, while focusing on the tort liability of the defendant, Judge Robinson ignored
the plaintiff's claim for violation of his civil rights. Presumably the required element of state
action was missing. See section I(C) infra.
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from writing a bail bond in this Court in the future."72
McCaleb represents a radical departure from the earlier cases
which uniformly denied recovery to principals who may have been
abused :by their bondsman.73 It is the first reported case to hold that
a bondsman had overstepped the limits of his authority and was
therefore liable in tort to his principal. The very establishment of
some limits, however vaguely defined, on the nearly unrestricted
powers of bailbondsmen was a long overdue development 'in this
field of law.
An even more important case in terms of what it said, if not for
what it accomplished, is Shine v. State." Apparently Shine owed
the bond company $40 on a bond which it had written for him.75
Consequently three men armed with pistols and shotguns were sent
to Shine's house at 5:00 a.m. to arrest him.7" When one of the men
tried to break into the house, Shine shot and killed him.77 The
Alabama Appeals Court reversed Shine's conviction and granted a
new trial.78
The court harshly condemned the tactics and intent (collection
of a $40 debt) of the "armed posse."7 It pointed out that bond
companies have no right to arrest people for debts and certainly not
at 5:00 a.m., armed with pistols and shotguns.'" The court found
that Shine had been justified in believing that his victim was not a
law officer and therefore was under no obligation to surrender to
him. " Legitimately thinking himself to be in danger of great bodily
harm, he could be guilty of no greater crime than manslaughter. 2
The court then suggested that "[t]he controls over the bail should
henceforth be tightened to exclude the use of weapons when not
justified, to provide for investigation into every instance where it is
claimed that weapons are needed, and the mandatory accompani-
72. 250 F. Supp. at 515.
73. See section II supra.
74. 44 Ala. App. 171, 204 So. 2d 817 (1967). Though not actually a tort case, the elements
of a trespass and an assault and battery were present.
75. Id. at 173, 204 So. 2d at 818.
76. Id. at 174, 204 So. 2d at 818-19.
77. Id. at 175, 204 So. 2d at 820.
78. Id. at 182, 204 So. 2d at 827.
79. Id. at 181, 204 So. 2d at 826.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 178-79, 204 So. 2d at 823.
82. Id. at 178, 204 So. 2d at 823-24.
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ment by a law enforcement officer on such occasions.""
The decision of the court in Shine represents the strongest judicial
attack to date on the liberties bailbondsmen are allowed to take
with their principals. The Alabama Appeals Court not only con-
demned the methods used by bailbondsmen, but also emphatically
advocated strong legislative action to place strict controls on the
business. This call for legislative action was unprecedented:
The McCaleb and Shine decisions indicated a trend toward tigh-
ter controls on bailbondsmen. Yet in two subsequent cases there
appears to be a reversal of the trend and a return to the earlier lax
attitude.
Six years after Shine, the Alabama Appeals Court had another
opportunity to deal with the rights of bailbondsmen and their prin-
cipals in Livingston v. Browder.4 In this case the principal's mother
sued the bondsman for having entered her property, albeit peace-
fully, to arrest her son." The court held for the defendant and stated
that a bondsman has the authority to enter the dwelling of a third
party to arrest his principal if he knows the principal is in the
dwelling, properly identifies himself, and uses reasonable means to
gain entry."
While the Livingston court did articulate the applicable stan-
dards of conduct for a-bailbondsman in arresting his principal, it did
not add anything to the existing body of law. Instead, the court
emphasized the strong public policy reasons for protecting the bail-
principal relationship and the necessity of giving bondsmen broad
discretion in apprehending bail jumpers. 7
83. Id. at 181, 204 So. 2d at 826. The judge also emphasized that the only legitimate
purpose for such an arrest is to deliver the principal to the authorities, not to collect debts
on bonds. Id. at 178, 204 So. 2d at 823-24.
As did the McCaleb court, the court here determined that the bondsman had "reached
beyond the mantle of protection afforded by the law to a bondsman." McCaleb v. Peerless
Ins. Co., 250 F. Supp. 512, 515 (D. Neb. 1965).
84. 51 Ala. App. 366, 285 So. 2d 923 (1973).
85. Id. at 368, 285 So. 2d at 924-25. The son had failed to appear at a court hearing on a
drunk driving charge. Id. at 366, 285 So. 2d at 925.
86. Id. at 370, 285 So. 2d at 926-27. The court did not correctly construe this to be the
law and therefore the verdict was reversed and the case remanded.
87. Id. at 368, 285 So. 2d at 925. The court stated:
[tihere is a strong public policy in preventing the principal from "jumping bond"
and because of this, the surety is permitted a large discretion as to the steps necessary
to effect the apprehension of the principal. Clearly, this large amount of authority
allowed the surety is justified by the responsibility imposed on him.
19781 NOTES
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The Livingston decision is most interesting for what it did not say.
There is no mention whatsoever of the decision in Shine v. State"s
which came from the same bench and strongly advocated stricter
controls on the activities of bailbondsmen. Presented with a clear
opportunity to reinforce the stance taken in Shine, the Livingston
court chose to retreat to the traditional common law principles
which gave bailbondsmen "wide latitude . . . to arrest their princi-
pal.' '
Soon after Livingston, in 1975, the Tennessee Supreme Court also
took a step backward. In Poteete v. Olive" the plaintiff sued his
bailbondsman for false imprisonment, assault and battery." While
making the arrest the bondsman's agents beat and kicked the plain-
tiff and broke the plaintiff's leg.92 Although the plaintiff was
awarded several thousand dollars in damages,93 the court did not
base its decision on the agents' egregious assault. Rather it focused
on their failure to present the plaintiff with a certified copy of the
bond when they arrested him, as Tennessee law requires. 4
The Poteete court did not indicate that anything was wrong with
the manner in which the arrest was effected and implied that had
the bond been properly presented the plaintiff could not have re-
covered."
The current utility of the tort approach is therefore uncertain.
The earlier lack of judicial receptiveness to tort claims appeared to
be giving way to a more restrictive view of the rights of bailbonds-
men. But subsequent cases reveal a reluctance to effect a fundamen-
tal widespread change and seem to indicate that a principal suing
88. 44 Ala. App. 171, 204 So. 2d 817 (1967). See text accompanying notes 74-83 supra.
89. 51 Ala. App. at 368, 285 So. 2d at 925. The court gave little attention to the possible
or actual occurrences of abuses, except to say that those making arrests could use no more
force than is reasonably necessary. Id. at 369, 285 So. 2d at 927. The court could have voiced
support for stricter controls on bailbondsmen while still holding that the defendant had not
abused the powers traditionally granted bondsmen. In Shine, the court also acknowledged
the need for these powers but did not allow those arguments to override the need for controls
in view of the excesses of local bondsmen and their agents. 44 Ala. App. at 181, 204 So. 2d at
826.
90. 527 SW.2d 84 (Tenn. S.Ct. 1975).
91. Id. at 85.
92. Id. at 86.
93. Id.
94. Id. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-1227 (1975).
95. 527 S.W.2d at 89.
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his bailbondsman in tort will continue to have difficulty in recover-
ing for injuries inflicted by that bondsman.
C. Development of Limits Through A Federal Statutory and
Constitutional Approach
An alternative to the tort approach which has become increas-
ingly popular in actions against abusive bailbondsmen is the use of
constitutional principles and the federal Civil Rights Acts. 6 Again,
results have varied, but this approach appears to offer a greater
possibility of reducing abuses by bailbondsmen.
One of the most serious reported instances of abuse was described
in United States v. Trunko.17 In Trunko a deputy sheriff, authorized
by an Ohio bond company, tracked a bail jumper to Arkansas,
arrested him and returned him to Ohio. 8 In making the arrest, the
defendant burst ' into the fugitive's house at night, awakened him
from sleep, identified himself as a law officer from Ohio, handcuffed
him and then drove him nonstop back to Ohio.9
The deputy was indicted for violation of a 1909 civil rights statute
which prohibits anyone from wilfully depriving a person of his con-
stitutional rights and privileges under color of state law. 00 The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas
found that the defendant had acted under color of state law since
he had identified himself as an Ohio law officer.' The court also
decided that the fugitive was deprived of his constitutional rights.)"2
However, it was ultimately decided that the defendant was innocent
96. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1970) and 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970) have been employed in these
cases. See notes 100, 112, and 122 infra.
97. 189 F. Supp. 559 (E.D. Ark. 1960).
98. Id. at 560.
99. Id. at 561.
100. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970) which provides:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, wilfully
subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of
the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties on account of such
inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for
the punishment of citizens, shall be fined not more than $1000 or imprisoned not more
than one year, or both; and if death results shall be subject to imprisonment for any
term or for life.
(emphasis added).
101. 189 F. Supp. at 565.
102. Id. at 564. The violation was of constitutional due process.
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of the charges because he had not acted wilfully in depriving the
fugitive of his rights.0 3
The court, nevertheless, severely condemned the defendant's ac-
tions, describing them as "high-handed, unreasonable, and oppres-
sive"'0 4 and further declaring that the "defendant's actions consti-
tuted an affront to the duly constituted authority of [the state and
local governments] and were of a nature tending to bring law en-
forcement into disrepute."'0 5 While acquitting the defendant on pos-
sibly dubious grounds,'" the district court emphatically criticized
the violent tactics employed by the agent of the bailbondsman. 7
Similarly, the decision in Thomas v. Miller'°5 indicated a growing
judicial disapproval of the methods used by bailbondsmen in arrest-
ing their principals, although the plaintiff in this civil case failed to
recover. In Thomas the plaintiff failed to appear for imprisonment
following the denial of his appeal of a grand larceny conviction.101
He thereupon fled from Tennessee to Ohio."10 His bailbondsman
tracked him to Ohio, arrested him, chained him hand and foot, and
allegedly forced him to ride on the floor of his car during the drive
back to Tennessee."'
Plaintiff sued in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Tennessee, claiming damages against his bondsman for
violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which makes it an action-
103. Id. at 564-65. See note 100 supra.
104. Id. at 565.
105. Id.
106. The court may have construed the statute too narrowly when it upbraided the defen-
dant in harsh terms for his actions, while on the other hand deciding that his actions were
not accompanied by any specific intent to deprive the fugitive of his constitutional rights.
189 F. Supp. at 564. It is certain that the defendant was ignorant of the statute and perhaps
even of the Constitution but ignorance of the law normally is not a valid defense. LAFAvE &
ScO-r, CRIMINAL LAW 356 (1972). It is also certain that whatever Trunko did, he did wilfully.
To require a conscious wilfulness to deprive a person of his constitutional rights is, in effect,
to vitiate the statute and make convictions close to impossible. See Screws v. United States,
325 U.S. 91, 101-07 (1945) which discusses this question at length.
107. 189 F. Supp. at 565. The court also may have contradicted itself by damning the
defendant for his in terrorem tactics while implying that if the defendant had identified
himself properly his actions would have been beyond reproach. In other words, what is
outrageous if done in the name of the law, is acceptable if done by private persons. See note
100 and accompanying text supra.
108. 282 F. Supp. 571 (E.D. Tenn. 1968).
109. Id. at 572.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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able civil wrong to deprive any person of his constitutional rights
and privileges under the color of state law."' He made no tort claim.
The court dismissed the action because the defendant had not
acted under color of state law."3 Since the defendants "were acting
by reason of a contractual relationship with him,""' the court could
supply no remedy for the plaintiff.
The court agreed that plaintiff was treated "roughly""' and sug-
gested that he might have a cause of action in state court for "cruel
and inhuman treatment" during the trip from Ohio to Tennessee.'
While not as far reaching as McCaleb, Shine,"7 or Trunko, the
Thomas court indicated that there are limits to how far a bailbonds-
man can go in apprehending fugitive principals. The court implied
that those limits were exceeded and if the defendants were acting
under color of state law the plaintiff may have recovered."'
A year after Thomas v. Miller was decided, the United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota dealt with a similar
problem in Curtis v. Peerless Insurance Co."' Curtis also was re-
turned to Tennessee from Minnesota after jumping bail on a drunk
driving charge. 120 Although he was handcuffed for a short time, his
arrest was peaceful, and the defendants carried no firearms. 2' Cur-
tis sued for false imprisonment and deprivation of his civil rights,
also under the Civil Rights Act of 1871.122 The court acknowledged
that an action for unlawful seizure was cognizable under those stat-
112. Id. at 572-73. The plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
113. 282 F. Supp. at 573.
114. Id. at 573.
115. Id. at 572.
116. Id.
117. See section III(B) supra.
118. 282 F. Supp. at 572-73.
119. 299 F. Supp. 429 (D. Minn. 1969).
120. Id. at 431.
121. Id. at 432.
122. Id. at 431. Curtis sued under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 (1970). For the text of
section 1983 see note 112 supra. Section 1985 provides for a civil cause of action against two
or more persons who conspire to deprive any person of his constitutional rights, privileges and
immunities.
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utes.23 Again, the missing element was action under color of state
law. In this case the plaintiff himself had failed to allege that the
defendants had acted under color of state law. Therefore the action
for violation of the plaintiff's civil rights was dismissed.2 ' The court
reiterated that the private contractual bail-principal relationship
permitted such an arrest and that no state action was involved.'
As in Thomas, the court in dictum dealt with the problem of
abuses: "So long as the bounds of reasonable means needed to effect
the apprehension are.not transgressed, and the purpose of the recap-
ture is proper in the light of the surety's undertaking, sureties will
not be liable for returning their principals to proper custody."', 6
In Curtis the bounds of reasonable means were not transgressed
because the arrest was peaceful and the plaintiff was unharmed.
The court rejected the plaintiff's allegation that the defendants were
"malicious and wanton," but intimated that such a showing would
make them liable.'27 Since the plaintiff was not harmed the court
did not have to delineate the "bounds of reasonable means." Conse-
quently no concrete standards can be derived from this decision.
Nevertheless, the Curtis opinion is noteworthy for its assertion in
dictum that there are limits to the power of bailbondsmen.
Another constitutional challenge to the rights of bailbondsmen
was decided in Smith v. Rosenbaum. 2 Smith was out on bail when
he was arrested on another charge. Under the terms of the bail
contract, Smith had agreed that if he were arrested on another
charge the bondsman could surrender him to the authorities and
obtain exoneration of the bond.'29 The bondsman did surrender him
in this manner, complying with Pennsylvania law which requires
the bondsman to obtain a certified copy of the bond from an officer
123. 299 F. Supp. at 434.
124. Id. at 435.
125. Id. at 435. Curiously, the court did not address the plaintiff's tort claim for false
imprisonment. The court in McCaleb v. Peerless Ins. Co., 250 F. Supp. 512 (D. Neb. 1965)
(see text accompanying notes 63-72 supra) did the opposite, ignoring the civil rights claim of
the plaintiff and holding for the plaintiff solely on the basis of his tort claim. In Curtis, the
court could have found in the plaintiff's favor despite his lack of a civil rights action, if the
arrest and imprisonment had been otherwise tortious. Clearly, in view of the facts and the
prevailing law, it was not.
126. 299 F. Supp. at 435.
127. Id. at 433, 435.
128. 333 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
129. Id. at 36-37, 39.
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of the court before making the arrest. 3 '
As in Curtis there was no mistreatment or physical abuse of the
plaintiff. He merely charged that the act of obtaining a certified
copy of the bond deprived him of his constitutional rights and privi-
leges and he was therefore entitled to damages under the Civil
Rights Acts. 3'
The court found that obtaining the certified copy of the bond
constituted an act under color of state law because Pennsylvania
law mandated this procedure.'32 However, the court concluded that
neither the plaintiff's rights under the statute nor due process of law
were violated.'33 Having agreed to the terms of the private bail con-
tract, the plaintiff could not claim that his rights were violated
when the defendants merely acted pursuant to the terms of that
contract.'3 '
Unlike the other cases brought under the Civil Rights Acts, 13 the
Smith court found that there was action under color of state law.
The Pennsylvania law under which the bailbondsman acted is simi-
lar to statutes in a number of other states.3 ' Nevertheless, the
Smith decision is the first case to hold that the action of obtaining
a certified copy of the bond is an action under color of state law for
the purposes of the Civil Rights Acts. This decision established a
major precedent for extending the concept of state action to include
the activities of bailbondsmen and thus removing one of the major
obstacles to recovery under the Civil Rights Acts.3 7
130. Id. at 37-38. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit 19 § 53 (1964 Purdon, suspended Supp. 1977-78).
131. 333 F. Supp. at 37. The suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 (1970).
See notes 100, 122 supra.
132. 333 F. Supp. at 38-39.
133. Id. at 39.
134. Id. The court also held that there was no conspiracy in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985
(1970). Although his action was under color of state law, the court clerk was also exonerated
because under § 1983 state judicial and quasi-judicial officers are immune from suit. Id. at
38-39.
135. Curtis v. Peerless Ins. Co., 299 F. Supp. 429 (D. Minn. 1969); Thomas v. Miller, 282
F. Supp. 571 (E.D. Tenn. 1968).
136. See note 58 supra.
137. If the activities of bailbondsmen were to be considered state action, requirements of
due process would apply to those actions. Failure to meet those requirements would then
make recovery under the Civil Rights Acts likely. Actual physical abuse, essential to any tort
recovery, would not be necessary, although if it did occur there would be grounds for both
civil rights and tort liability. At any rate, extension of state action to cover bailbondsmen
would go far toward reducing abuses.
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D. The Development of Limits Through Procedural
Requirements-Greater Controls In Some States
The traditional common law allowed the bailbondsman to arrest
his principal without a warrant, a certified copy (usually by the
court clerk) of the bond undertaking being sufficient evidence of the
bondsman's contractual right to make the arrest.3 ' Several states
have codified this common law requirement. 3 Furthermore, since
the Nicolls"0 and Read"' decisions, a bondsman or his agent, when
attempting to arrest a principal in a dwelling, is required to an-
nounce his identity and demand peaceful surrender before breaking
in to make the arrest.
Even when confronting his principal in a public place, the bonds-
man (or his agent) is required to announce his identity and intention
and present the principal with a copy of the bond."'
Texas has gone furthest in controlling the procedural aspects of
bailbondsmen's activities. In Austin v. Texas, 3 the bondsman was
convicted on a criminal charge of false imprisonment."' He had
written a $5,000 bail bond for a principal who later jumped bail.'"
In rearresting his principal to avoid forteiture of the bond, the
bondsman, along with two private citizens, kicked in the man's
door, wrestled him to the ground and handcuffed him."' The bonds-
man had no arrest warrant as required by the Texas Criminal
Code" 7 for a non-peaceable seizure. His conviction was affirmed, the
bondsman having failed to comply with the statutory mandate." 8
Despite the court's failure to condemn the forcible nature of the
138. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
139. See note 58 supra.
140. 7 Johns. (N.Y.) 145 (1810).
141. 4 Conn. 166 (1822).
142. Poteete v. Olive, 527 S.W.2d 84, 89 (Tenn. S.Ct. 1975).
143. 541 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. Cr. App. 1976).
144. Id. at 163.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. TEx. CODE CraM. PRoc. Art 17.19 (Vernon 1977).
148. 541 S.W.2d at 164. Again, the defendant was convicted for failure to comply with
procedures rather than for the violent tactics used to make the arrest. The court should have
addressed the problem of such violence, but it rejected the invitation to reinforce Shine v.
State, 44 Ala. App. 171, 204 So. 2d 817 (1967), just as the Tennessee court did in Poteete v.
Olive, 527 S.W.2d 84 (Tenn. S.Ct. 1975). See notes 74-83 and 90-95 and accompanying text
supra.
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arrest, it is clear that the statute provides certain safeguards. Re-
quiring bondsmen to go before a judge or magistrate and justify the
need for a warrant has the effect of putting bondsmen under greater
judicial supervision. Their conduct would be subject to the same
scrutiny that the courts give to government law enforcement agen-
cies. Perhaps even more important, the courts would then be more
likely to consider arrests made with such warrants to be under color
of state law. 4 ' Accordingly, a major obstacle to a finding of civil
rights violations would be eliminated.
Another state to enact strict legislation controlling bailbondsmen
is California. Under the California statute5 ' a bailbondsman from
another state seeking to arrest a fugitive bail-jumper from that other
state must file affidavits and appear at a hearing before a local
magistrate. 5' If the magistrate decides that there is probable cause
to believe the bailbondsman, a warrant for the fugitive's arrest is
issued and he is brought before the magistrate, who sets a time and
place for a hearing and advises the individual of his rights to counsel
and to the production of evidence at the hearing. 5 ' If the magistrate
is convinced that the suspect is a fugitive from bail he will issue an
order allowing the bondsman to return the fugitive to the jurisdic-
tion from which he escaped. 5 3 Failure to comply with the statute is
a misdemeanor.'54
The California procedures, although not applicable to California
bail-jumpers, are a great improvement over the common law. Pro-
tection against mistaken identities, a chance for a fair hearing in
open court with the benefit of counsel and greater scrutiny of the
activities of bailbondsmen are the results of this statute.55 Indeed,
there appears to be no reason why bailbondsman should not be
subject to the same requirements of due process as are all federal,
state and local law enforcement agencies. 50
149. As noted above, arrests made with a certified copy of the bond are not usually held
to be under color of state law. See section 1I(C) supra.
150. CAL. PENAL CODE § 847.5 (West 1970).
151. Id.
152. Id. Pending the hearing the suspect may be admitted to local bail.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See Note, Bailbondsmen And the Fugitive Accused-The Need For Formal Removal
Procedures, 73 Yale L.J. 1098 (1964) dealing extensively with the need for extradition proce-
dures in this area and advocating nation-wide enactment of statutes such as that in Califor-
nia.
156. U.S. CONST., amends. V and XIV.
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IV. Conclusion
As the court stated in Nicolls v. Ingersoll, "I restricting bondsmen
too severely could impair their right to protect their bonds.," This
in turn could affect the freedom of accused persons not yet proven
guilty. Deprived of their enforcement remedies, few bondsmen
might be willing to write bonds, making it more difficult for accused
persons to obtain bail. It is no less important, however, to protect
the constitutional and civil rights of accused persons, preserve the
public peace and avoid violence.
There are several steps which should be taken on the state and
federal level to balance the needs of bailbondsmen with the rights
of accused persons. They are: 1. requiring bondsmen to obtain a
bench warrant for the arrest of any principal, whether or not the
principal has fled the jurisdiction;5 ' 2. requiring bondsmen to jus-
tify the need for firearms before a judge;' 0 3. requiring the accompa-
niment of a law officer when the carrying of firearms is approved;"'
4. requiring a formal extradition hearing when a bondsman seeks to
arrest a principal in another state and return him to the home
jurisdiction;' 2 5. requiring that such an arrest be made with a lo-
cally obtained arrest warrant and under the supervision of local law
enforcement officers.' 63 6. requiring that a bondsman who exceeds
"the mantle of protection afforded by the law to bondsmen," be
suspended or permanently prohibited from writing bonds in that
jurisdiction in the future.'
Michael Goldstein
157. 7 Johns. (N.Y. 145 (1810).
158. Id. at 156.
159. Austin v. Texas, 541 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. Cr. App. 1976); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. Art.
17.19 (1977 Vernon).
160. Shine v. State, 44 Ala. App. 171, 204 So. 2d 817 (1967). See text accompanying notes
74-83 supra.
161. Id.
162. CAL. PENAL CODE § 847.5 (West 1970). See text accompanying notes 150-55 supra.
163. Id.
164. McCaleb v. Peerless Ins. Co., 250 F. Supp. 512, 515 (D. Neb. 1965).
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